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A House Divided:  The Invisibility of
the Multiracial Family
Angela Onwuachi-Willig*
Jacob Willig-Onwuachi**
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, Peggy McIntosh expounded upon the theoretical
concept of white privilege in her paper, White Privilege:  Unpacking the
Invisible Knapsack.1  White privilege, she said, “is like an invisible weight-
less knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas,
clothes, tools, and blank checks”2 that includes individual advantages such
as the following:
1. I can, if I wish, arrange to be in the company of people of my race
most of the time.
2. I can avoid spending time with people whom I was trained to mis-
trust and who have learned to mistrust my kind or me.
3. If I should need to move, I can be pretty sure of renting or purchas-
ing housing in an area which I can afford and in which I would want to
live.
4. I can be pretty sure that my neighbors in such a location will be
neutral or pleasant to me.
5. I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I
will not be followed or harassed.3
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sack.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
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Twenty years later, in 2008, McIntosh’s words ring equally true and
have become a staple in the anti-racist literary canon.  We, a black4 woman
and a white man who are married and living together in Iowa with our three
biracial children, have given McIntosh’s work serious thought over the years,
both voluntarily and involuntarily.  We use it in our lives as a basis for ex-
amining our own invisible knapsacks of privilege, such as our unearned
privileges as heterosexuals.  For example, in our actions and efforts to sup-
port the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, we often remind ourselves
of the benefits that we have received as a result of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Loving v. Virginia5 in 1967. Loving held that anti-miscegenation
statutes were unconstitutional, thus ensuring at least the legality of our mul-
tiracial marriage in every state.6  We also use McIntosh’s work as a basis for
understanding our own individual social advantages and disadvantages as a
result of our two different races.  For instance, I, Jacob, a white man, am
often reminded of my own white privilege when I shop alone in malls and
am neither followed around in stores nor asked to produce various forms of
identification when purchasing items.7  Whereas I, Angela, a black woman,
am often exposed to my racial disadvantage when I read the newspaper,
watch television, or listen to the news, all of which are filled with negative
and stereotypical images of black people.8  Finally, we use McIntosh’s work
4 We prefer to use the term “blacks” to the term “African Americans” because the term
“blacks” is more inclusive. See Why “Black” and Not “African-American,” Adan Gonzalez, 3
J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 18, 18-19 (1994) (explaining why the term “black” is a more inclu-
sive term than “African-American”).  Additionally, we find that “[i]t is more convenient to
invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between African-
American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic
symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in
Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4
(1992).
5 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6 Id.; see also infra Part II.B.  Almost twenty years before Loving, the California Supreme
Court struck down California’s anti-miscegenation statute in Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal.
1948). See R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the
Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 847 (2008) (using Perez to argue that
“identity-based restrictions that prohibit someone from marrying the ‘person of [her] choice’
inflict significant citizenship harm”).
7 See Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a
“Race-Making Situation,” 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 797-98 (2001-2002) (detailing how
professionally dressed black people are routinely followed in stores); James Ragland, Black
Shoppers Feel They’re Unwelcome: Oprah Isn’t the Only One Complaining about Stores, Study
Said, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 7, 2005, at 7E. (“The Oprah incident [in which billion-
aire Oprah Winfrey was prevented from entering an Hermes store in Paris, allegedly because
the store had been having problems with North African women] renewed talk about racial
profiling in stores. The study found that 56 percent of black respondents sensed that store
clerks or security guards were watching them more closely than other customers. By compari-
son, 40 percent of Hispanic and 17 percent of white respondents say the same thing.”).
8 See CAMILLE O. COSBY, TELEVISION’S IMAGEABLE INFLUENCES 36-37 (Wellington &
Chiu, eds. 1994)  (describing images of black people in the media as the “Savage African,
Happy slave, Devoted servant, Corrupt politician, Irresponsible citizen, Petty thief, Social de-
linquent, Vicious criminal, Sexual superman, Unhappy non-white, Natural-born cook, Perfect
entertainer, Superstitious churchgoer, Chicken and watermelon eater, Razor and knife ‘toter’,
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1385482
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as a means for understanding and evaluating the ways in which our racial
advantages and disadvantages are complicated by our marital union.  Prima-
rily, we use it as an avenue for understanding the ways in which our privi-
leges—mainly Jacob’s—disappear as a result of our marriage.
More than forty years after Loving, we continue the legacy of the case’s
named plaintiffs, Mildred and Richard Loving.  We endure the legacy of the
Lovings’ social lives, which, even after the historic decision, were affected
by both conscious discriminatory attitudes and unconscious biases.  We also,
however, benefit from their courage through a range of legal privileges and
protections that stem from the Supreme Court’s recognition of their funda-
mental right to marry regardless of race.
While Loving has forever changed the lives of interracial, heterosexual
couples by allowing them to legally marry, it has not led society to embrace
all multiracial couples and families.  Instead, society and law continue to
assume that all intimate couples and families are monoracial.  This Article
examines how society and law work together to frame the normative ideal of
intimate couples and families as both heterosexual and monoracial.9  In so
doing, this Article focuses solely on the issue of race and the privilege of
monoraciality among intimate couples and does not address the privilege of
heterosexuality among couples, which is readily evident within our society.10
Uninhibited expressionist, Mentally inferior [and] Natural-born musician”) (quoting
Nagueyalti Warren, From Uncle Tom to Cliff Huxtable, Aunt Jemima to Aunt Nell: Images of
Blacks in Film and the Television Industry, in IMAGES OF BLACKS IN AMERICAN CULTURE: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO INFORMATION SOURCES, 51, 51-52, (Jessie Carney Smith ed., 1988));
Patricia M. Worthy, Diversity and Minority Stereotyping in the Television Media: The Unset-
tled First Amendment Issue, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 509, 536 (1995-1996) (“Re-
search confirms that the news coverage relating to African-Americans is consistently negative,
focusing solely on crime or other unpleasant characteristics.”); see also Leonard M. Baynes,
Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business Judgment Rule, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 819, 893-96 (2003) (discussing the negative effects of racial stereotypes in the media,
especially on children); Sherri Burr, Television and Societal Effects: An Analysis of Media
Images of African-Americans in Historical Context, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 159 (2001)
(discussing effects of images of black people in the media since the 1950s).
9 See Lenhardt, supra note 6, at 882 (“Just as important as this setting of social norms, R
however, is the extent to which state regulations have also served over time to reproduce and
police identity norms in the marriage context.”); Melissa Murray, The Space Between: The
Intersection of Criminal Law and Family Law  94 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manu-
script at 31-48, on file with the authors) (analyzing how criminal law and family law work
together to reinforce normative ideals of family).
10 This Article addresses statutes that are assumed to adequately protect interracial, hetero-
sexual couples in a post-Loving era, but that do not do so because they create no space for such
couples in their language.  It is true that many of the privileges that attach to monoracial,
heterosexual couples also do not attach to monoracial, same-sex couples; however, because
anti-discrimination law generally excludes homosexual individuals from protection from dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation and because there is prevalent, open prejudice against
same-sex couples in our society, the statutory language and law discussed herein is generally
not seen as protective of same-sex couples.  In other words, the hole in anti-discrimination law
for same-sex couples is widely exposed for all who are willing to acknowledge it, while it is
not so easily exposed for interracial, heterosexual couples.  Our hope is to expose this hole.
See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,”
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 303
(2001) (“[B]ecause sexual orientation remains an unprotected category in federal statutory
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The Article does, however, repeatedly use the term “heterosexual” in
describing its focus in order to acknowledge that the privilege of
monoraciality in families does not extend fully to same-sex couples and
families.
This Article sets out to accomplish three goals.  First, it examines the
daily social privileges of monoracial, heterosexual couples as a means of
revealing the invisibility of interracial marriages and families within our so-
ciety.  Specifically, Part II of this Article follows the path of McIntosh by
thinking through unacknowledged monoracial, heterosexual-couple privi-
leges and listing unearned privileges, both social and legal, for such couples.
It also uses Kimberle´ Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality to explicate how
couples in general may experience societal benefits and disadvantages dif-
ferently based upon various intersections of identity categories.
Second, this Article examines housing discrimination law to demon-
strate the connection between the daily social disadvantages of interracial,
heterosexual couples and families and the lack of legal recognition for inter-
racial couples and families.  Specifically, Part III of this Article uses housing
discrimination law to show how law can ignore the existence of interracial,
heterosexual couples thereby reinforcing an ideal of marriage and family as
monoracial.  In so doing, this Part explains how housing discrimination stat-
utes assume that plaintiffs will be monoracial, heterosexual couples, and fail
to fully address the harms to interracial, heterosexual couples who are sub-
jected to discrimination in housing and rental searches because of their inter-
raciality (e.g., because they have engaged in race-mixing).  Part III.A
describes the legal framework for evaluating housing discrimination cases,
including the means for analyzing discrimination by association cases in
court.  Part III.B details the categories of plaintiffs who can allege discrimi-
natory action “because of” race, familial status, or marital status under hous-
ing discrimination statutes.  It then explicates how interracial couples who
are victims of discrimination in housing because of their status as an interra-
cial couple alone do not neatly fit within any of these categories.
Third, this Article calls for housing discrimination statutes to explicitly
recognize interracial couples and families, thereby filling this hole in anti-
discrimination law.  Specifically, Part IV proposes that legislators add a new
protected class category for “interraciality” to housing discrimination stat-
utes.  The Article argues that such an addition is the only means by which
the law can address the “expressive harms”11 or lack of dignity12 that result
and constitutional civil rights law, discriminators may willingly concede sexual orientation
discrimination when some evidence of discriminatory action exists, but deny racial or gender
discrimination.”).  Still, as this Article seeks to reveal about heterosexual couples, the disad-
vantages that attach to same-sex couples in our society can become further complicated by
other identity categories, such as interraciality.
11 See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 506-07 (1993) (defining expressive harms as harms that “result[ ] from the ideas or
attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or mate-
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from the current framing of family in housing discrimination statutes as
monoracial.
This Article concludes with a call for statutes and rights to be legally
framed in a manner that is inclusive, rather than exclusive.
II. EXPOSING ONE MORE INVISIBLE KNAPSACK OF PRIVILEGES
All individuals in our society possess one or more invisible knapsacks
of unearned privileges, whether they be based on race, color, class, sex, re-
ligion, sexual orientation, nationality, able-bodied-ness, marital status, or
other identity categories.  At the same time, however, individuals also may
suffer or endure societal disadvantages that attach to one or more of their
identity categories.13   This Part discusses these advantages and disadvan-
tages as they relate to people who are involved in committed, intimate rela-
tionships.  Part II.A focuses on the unearned privileges that individuals
involved in intimate, heterosexual relationships generally enjoy.  Part II.B
addresses those privileges as they relate to interracial, heterosexual couples.
A. Filling the Heterosexual Knapsack of Privileges
Just as McIntosh has been taught throughout her life not to recognize
her white privilege, many heterosexuals have been conditioned to remain
oblivious about their own unearned privileges based on sexual orientation.14
In general, heterosexual individuals and couples enjoy many social and legal
benefits in our society.  A few examples of heterosexual privilege include
the following:15
rial consequences the action brings about”); see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional
Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretative Approach of Baker v.
Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1107 n.19 (2002) (asserting that “the expressive harms approach
asks the Court to interpret the social meaning of state action and to incorporate social meaning
into constitutional interpretation”).
12 Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 676
(2005) (arguing “that dignity is (and always has been) a central area of concern in the struggle
for racial justice, and that current Supreme Court jurisprudence indulges in delusional and
counterfeit thinking when it chooses to undervalue, distort, or evade entirely core dignitary
concerns in the context of racial disputes”).
13 See infra Part II.B for a discussion on intersectionality.
14 See McIntosh, supra note 1 (“I began to count the ways in which I enjoy unearned skin R
privilege and have been conditioned into oblivion about its existence.  My schooling gave me
no training in seeing myself as an oppressor, as an unfairly advantaged person, or as a partici-
pant in a damaged culture.”); see also Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language
and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 890 (1995)
(“First, the characteristics of the privileged group define the societal norm, often benefiting
those in the privileged group. Second, privileged group members can rely on their privilege
and avoid objecting to oppression. Both conflicting privilege with the societal norm and the
implicit choice to ignore oppression mean that privilege is rarely seen by the holder of the
privilege.”).
15 This list closely tracks portions of McIntosh’s list in her paper White Privilege: Unpack-
ing the Invisible Knapsack, supra note 1 and text accompanying note 3. R
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\44-1\HLC108.txt unknown Seq: 6 29-JAN-09 8:05
236 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 44
1. In all fifty states, intimate heterosexual partners can marry each
other as long as they do not violate other marital restrictions, such
as age or number restrictions, and can have their marriage recog-
nized by every other state in the union.
2. Heterosexual couples can turn on the television or read the newspa-
per and see reflections of their cross-sex, intimate relationships
widely represented.
3. So long as they are otherwise qualified, heterosexual couples can
adopt children in all fifty states.
4. When out in public, the children of heterosexuals are presumed to
“belong” to them as parents.
5. The children of heterosexual couples are given texts and classes
that implicitly support their family unit.
This particular list of heterosexual privileges is not exhaustive, yet it
illustrates McIntosh’s point about how privilege can make insiders “feel wel-
comed and ‘normal’ in the usual walks of public life, institutional and so-
cial,” and make outsiders feel unwelcome and without a home in those same
areas.16
Indeed, while this list of heterosexual advantages could be endless, the
list of heterosexual couples that may enjoy all of these benefits is more re-
stricted.  Because of the interlocking nature of hierarchies in our society, not
all heterosexual couples are treated equally.  Every couple’s experiences in
the world can be complicated by other identity categories, such as inter-
raciality or socioeconomic class.  The next section of this Article discusses
restrictions that specifically affect interracial, heterosexual couples.
B. Unpacking the Heterosexual Knapsack of Privileges
In 1964, Mildred (Jeter), a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white
man, filed a class action lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of Vir-
ginia’s ban on interracial marriage.17  Just six years earlier in 1958, Mildred
and Richard had left their home state of Virginia, which enforced anti-misce-
genation statutes, to marry each other in Washington, D.C., which did not
prohibit interracial marriages.18  Following their marriage, the Lovings had
returned to reside in their home state.19  In Virginia, however, they were
arrested, charged with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriages, and
threatened with the enforcement of a one-year prison sentence unless they
16 See McIntosh, supra note 1; see also Camille A. Nelson, Lovin’ the Man: Examining the R
Legal Nexus of Irony, Hypocrisy, and Curiosity, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 543, 549 (“Like other
racialized couples, my partner and I do not have the luxury of simply venturing where we
might—we often reflect upon whether certain venues will be welcoming, comfortable, or
safe.”).
17 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
18 Id. at 2-3.
19 Id. at 2.
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left the state without returning for twenty-five years.20  Upon hearing the
Lovings’ claims on appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statutes and ruled in favor of the Lov-
ings.21  In so doing, the Court rejected Virginia’s argument that its anti-mis-
cegenation statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they
applied equally to whites and non-whites.22  The Court reasoned that such a
defense could not legitimate statutes that had no purpose other than to dis-
criminate against racial minorities and promote white supremacy.23  The
Court further held that the statutes violated the Due Process Clause because
marriage was a fundamental right that rested with the individual, a right that
the State could not restrict by invidious racial discrimination.24
Since that historic day in 1967, the Loving decision has consistently
been highlighted as a transformative case on race relations and a symbol of
the steady breakdown of racial barriers in intimate and personal relation-
ships.25  Same-sex marriage advocates applaud Loving as an important case
that protects citizens’ private decisions about whom they choose to love and
with whom they choose to join together in family.26  Legal scholars such as
Randall Kennedy encourage the public to view Loving as a tool for actively
advancing and facilitating interracial relationships in the fight against
racism.27
Although forty years have passed since the groundbreaking decision
was issued, our society does not necessarily recognize and acknowledge in-
20 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id. at 2, 12.
22 Id. at 9-12.
23 Id. at 11-12.
24 Id. at 12.
25 See, e.g., Robert A. Destro, Introduction to Symposium, Law and the Politics of Mar-
riage: Loving After 30 Years, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207, 1219-21 (1998) (describing Loving
as an important case on race and eugenics); Reginald Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadow
of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a System of Racial and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1323, 1333 (2006) (arguing that “Loving is as much a case about racial
segregation in public schools as Brown [v. Board of Education] is a case about prohibiting
interracial marriages” in that “[r]acial segregation and antimiscegenation practices were ulti-
mately designed to further the same goal: to preserve white racial purity and maintain a social
system of white supremacy”); Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualiza-
tion and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (1979) (discussing how both Brown and
Loving reflect the principle that “no person is by virtue of race morally inferior to another”).
26 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sheila Rose Foster, Remark, Discussion of Same-Sex
Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 329, 333 (1998) (“People say, ‘you can’t have
same-sex marriage,’ and you remind them to think about thirty or forty years ago. Forty years
ago in West Virginia, where I grew up, it was UNTHINKABLE for a different-race couple to
marry. . . . The point to be made from that is the ‘constructedness’ of marriage, and lines for
cordoning people off within marriage.”); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover
Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 905-06 (2006) (arguing in favor of analogies of the ban on
interracial marriages prior to Loving to the ban on same-sex unions, as the former was rooted
in white supremacy and the latter is rooted in heterosupremacy and male supremacy).
27 Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing with Loving?: Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 77
B.U. L. REV. 815, 819 (1997) (“In my view, black-white intermarriage is not simply some-
thing that should be tolerated—it is a mode of partnership that should be applauded and
encouraged.”).
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terracial and multiracial couples and families in all aspects of life.  Specifi-
cally, interracial, heterosexual couples cannot and do not experience every
privilege that we identified above in Part II.A.  Instead, their interraciality as
a couple tends to complicate their ability to “enjoy” the full range of hetero-
sexual advantages.
As Kimberle´ Crenshaw illustrated in her seminal work on intersection-
ality, different groups of people may encounter varied forms of discrimina-
tory behavior based upon the intersection of two or more identity
categories.28  Intersectionality recognizes that power, privilege, disadvan-
tage, and discrimination are influenced by interlocking spectrums of identity.
For example, because the identities of black men and black women differ
along the intersection of race and sex, black women may have distinct vul-
nerabilities to violence and discrimination from black men.29  Although
Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality focused on black women and the ways
in which they are uniquely oppressed based on the convergence of racism
and sexism in their lives, her theory can be applied to other groups.  Scholars
in many fields use Crenshaw’s theory to discuss the complex nature of op-
pression and discrimination along multiple axes.30
While interracial, heterosexual couples may face discrimination based
upon a single identity category such as their marital status or socioeconomic
class, they also may encounter discrimination at the intersection of race and
family.  As we, Jacob and Angela, have seen in our own lives, our inter-
28 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-43 (1991) (explaining that
women of color are at the intersection of race and gender oppression). See also Kimberle´
Williams Crenshaw, Transcript, Panel Presentation on Cultural Battery, Speaker: Kimberle´
Williams Crenshaw, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 891, 892 (1995) (“Intersectionality generally func-
tions as a metaphor for capturing the different dimensions of race and gender as they converge
in the lives of women of color.”); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and
Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1775 (2003) (asserting that intersec-
tionality is a “concept that conveys at least the following two ideas: (1) that our identities are
intersectional—that is, raced, gendered, sexually oriented, etc.—and (2) that our vulnerability
to discrimination is a function of our specific intersectional identities”).
29 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins at 1242-43; see also U.S. EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL, § 15, at 15-8 to -9 (2006), available at http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf
(discussing intersectional discrimination and noting that “Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of
1964] prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected trait (e.g., race), but also
because of the intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g., race and sex)”).
30 See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 302-16; see also Frank Rudy Cooper, Against R
Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierar-
chy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 860-74 (2006) (applying intersectionality theory to hetero-
sexual black men); Emily M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905, 924-38
(2006) (operationalizing anti-essentialism and intersectionality in a sexual harassment hypo-
thetical); Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 381 n.4 (“The
experiences for black heterosexual women in interracial relationships are also different than
those of black lesbians and black men in interracial relationships.”); Gowri Ramachandran,
Intersectionality as “Catch-22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless
Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 301 (2005) (discussing the double bind of “intersec-
tionals,”  whom she defines as “persons who are members of more than one ‘low-status’ cate-
gory, such as women of color, queer persons of color, or indigent women”).
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raciality tends to make our very existence as a couple invisible and places
many of the privileges that generally attach to heterosexual couples and fam-
ilies outside of our reach.  For example, although we enjoy the individual
right to legally marry and have our marriage recognized in every state
throughout the nation, no other privilege on the list of heterosexual advan-
tages in Part II.A falls within our realm of benefits as a couple.31  Were we
now to reconstruct that list to comport with our own reality as a black fe-
male-white male couple, it would read as follows:
1. In all fifty states, we had the ability to legally marry each other,
and every state in the nation has had to give full faith and credit to
our marriage because of the Loving v. Virginia decision in 1967.
2. Heterosexual couples can turn on the television or read the newspa-
per and see reflections of their cross-sex, intimate relationships
widely represented.  But we do not see reflections of ourselves as a
married, interracial, heterosexual couple, widely represented in the
media.  Even when we do, the plot line nearly always ends in trag-
edy, spurred by the mixing of races.32
3. So long as they are qualified, heterosexual couples can adopt chil-
dren in all fifty states.  But even after the Multi-Ethnic Placement
Act,33 we as an interracial couple would encounter difficulty in
adopting children, especially children who were not of African
descent.34
4. When out in public, the children of heterosexuals are presumed to
“belong” to them as parents.  But when we are out in public, to-
gether or separately, our children often are not presumed to be
ours.  For example, people frequently ask us “Is that your child?”
or, “Are you playing big brother today?”  Little children tell us
that we do not “match” our children.35
5. The children of heterosexual couples are given texts and classes
that implicitly support their family unit.  But our children are not
31 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. See generally Adele M. Morrison, R
Same-Sex Loving: Supporting White Supremacy Through Same-Sex Marriage, 13 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 177 (2007) (noting that “mixed-sex interracial couples” are “normative by being
mixed-sex but non-normative by being mixed race”).
32 See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, There’s Just One Hitch, Will Smith: Examining
Title VII, Race, and Casting Discrimination on the Fortieth Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia,
2007 WIS. L. REV. 319 (analyzing the dearth of black-white interracial couples in film and
television as a result of casting discrimination based on perceived audience preferences).
33 Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108
Stat. 3518 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 622 (2000)).
34 For a general discussion of the difficulties interracial couples face in the adoption pro-
cess, see Interracial Couple Say They Were Denied Adoption Because They Had Not Suffered
Enough Racism, JET, Aug. 16, 1999, at 23, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m
1355/is_11/_96/ai_55588159.
35 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, A Beautiful Lie: Exploring Rhinelander v. Rhinelander as
a Formative Lesson on Race, Identity, Marriage, and Family, 95 CAL. L. REV. 2393, 2458
(2007); see also RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 155 (2001).
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given texts and classes that implicitly support our family unit.
Their texts almost never reflect or support the interethnic, interra-
cial diversity of our family.
As our list above demonstrates, different types of couples may have
different experiences based upon various intersections of identity categories.
For example, unlike monoracial, heterosexual couples, we often suffer the
daily microaggression of having our status as a family assumed away, even
when we are out with our children.  Other people rarely assume that we are
intimate partners when we go shopping together in the grocery store.  At
best, store cashiers and other customers assume that we are friends, even
with our rings on our hands and our children with us.  At worst, clerks speak
to Angela as though she were a random stranger throwing items into Jacob’s
basket.  Jacob is always asked, “Is this together?”  Similarly, other custom-
ers perceive us together as store clerk and shopper, almost always approach-
ing Angela to ask if she will assist them as well.36  Additionally, unlike
white, heterosexual couples, fear of mistreatment plays a role for us when
choosing public accommodations.  We try to plan where we will eat, play, or
stay overnight as a means of avoiding discrimination.37  At times, we even
“game” the system, sending Jacob in first to scope out the premises, or to
check us in at a hotel.  We also have encountered difficulty in finding neigh-
borhoods where people approve of our household.  Where possible, we have
steered ourselves directly to integrated neighborhoods.38
Other interracial, heterosexual couples face the same obstacles that we
do, regardless of any differences in the intersection of our identity catego-
ries.  For instance, the children of an Asian Pacific American male-white
female couple also are unlikely to be given texts or classes that implicitly
36 Other interracial couples have documented similar experiences. See, e.g., ERICA CHITO
CHILDS, NAVIGATING INTERRACIAL BORDERS: BLACK-WHITE COUPLES AND THEIR SOCIAL
WORLDS 40 (2005); PAUL C. ROSENBLATT ET AL., MULTIRACIAL COUPLES: BLACK AND WHITE
VOICES (1995). See generally Rashmi Goel, From Tainted to Sainted: The View of Interracial
Relations as Cultural Evangelism, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 489, 516-17 (“When faced with a
mixed-race couple, people seem to ignore or disbelieve activity that—for a same-race
couple—would be indicative of a relationship.  People often express surprise at the existence
of an interracial couple, asking in dumbfounded tones, ‘Are you two . . .  together?’”).
37 See Nelson, supra note 16, at 549 (“Navigation of the public space, versus the private R
sanctuary, is an issue requiring some deliberation on the part of many interracial couples.”
(footnote omitted)).
38 Other interracial families have made similar choices. See, e.g., HEATHER M. DALMAGE,
TRIPPING ON THE COLOR LINE: BLACK-WHITE MULTIRACIAL FAMILIES IN A RACIALLY DIVIDED
WORLD 95 (2000) (asserting that black-white mixed-race families “desire racially mixed
neighborhoods because there they can have a sense of safety and comfort and not face repeated
acts of border patrolling and racism”); Steven R. Holloway et al., Partnering ‘Out’ and Fitting
In: Residential Segregation and the Neighbourhood Contexts of Mixed-Race Households, 11
POPULATION, SPACE & PLACE 299, 319-20 (2005) (“All mixed-race household types are more
likely to live in diverse neighbourhood settings than same-race households. . . . [M]ixed-race
households tend to experience higher levels of neighbourhood racial diversity than white
same-race households, but lower levels than non-white same-race households. Black-white
pairings are an exception—they live in more diverse neighbourhoods than the black popula-
tion in general.” (emphasis added)).
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support their family unit.  Likewise, an Asian Pacific American male-white
female couple will see few media representations of similar couples.
While our experiences as an interracial, heterosexual couple are very
real for us (and many couples like us), they cannot be generalized to all
interracial, heterosexual couples.39  For instance, as detailed above, an Asian
Pacific American male-white female couple may suffer the same discrimina-
tion as we do, but they also may experience a particular event differently
than we would based upon their own combination of race, gender, class, and
sexuality.  When out shopping together in a grocery store, an Asian Pacific
American male, unlike Angela, is unlikely to be perceived as a store worker
who is servicing a white female customer.  Neither race nor gender stereo-
types regarding Asian Pacific American men lend themselves to that type of
imagery.40  Just changing the type of store, however, may alter the experi-
ence of both couples.  For example, in an electronics store, racialized and
gendered stereotypes may lead customers to believe that the Asian Pacific
American male is a worker who is servicing a white female customer.  In-
deed, as one couple—a white woman and an Indian American man—has
related to us, he is often approached by customers who believe that he is a
store worker when they are out together in an electronics or computer store.
Even other black female-white male couples may experience certain
events differently than we do along the intersection of race, family, and
color.  For example, a very light-skinned black woman with a white husband
may instead face the microagression of having people constantly assume that
her family is white, despite her own personal identification and that of her
children.  In sum, just as the disadvantages that people and families may
encounter in life can be similar across identity categories, they also can vary
based upon differing intersections of identity categories.
39 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity,
Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999) (discussing mul-
tidimensionality, which highlights the “interlocking sources of advantage and disadvantage”
that constitute discrimination).
40 Compare Peggie R. Smith, Regulating Paid Household Work: Class, Gender, Race, and
Agendas of Reform, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 851, 915-16 (1999) (noting how service work increas-
ingly became synonymous with black women), and Pamela J. Smith, Part II—Romantic Pa-
ternalism—The Ties That Bind: Hierarchies of Economic Oppression That Reveal Judicial
Disaffinity for Black Women and Men, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 181, 196-205 (1999)
(describing the linkage between the images of black women and service workers), with Rich-
ard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil Rights, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 1691, 1720 (2007) (“[T]he dominant stereotype of the Asian male is sexless: Nerdy.
No body hair.  Thick glasses.  Good at math and science.  Bad at sports.”). See also Cynthia
Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and White: Racializing Asian Americans in a Society Obsessed
with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 165, 190 n.120 (1995) (noting that “one common set of
racial images portrays the typical Asian American as someone with a heavy accent, who works
in a laundry or as a gardener, practices karate, and studies fastidiously”).
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III. UNCOVERING THE LEGAL INVISIBILITY OF THE INTERRACIAL FAMILY
The disadvantages of interracial couples are not limited to the social
context alone.  The law, too, plays its own role in reifying and reinforcing
the normative ideal of coupling, marriage, and family as monoracial.  This
role is evident in the language and application of Title VIII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, also known as the Fair Housing Act.41  This Part uses
housing discrimination law as a tool for emphasizing the continuities be-
tween social discrimination against interracial, heterosexual couples, and the
failure to recognize interracial, heterosexual family units within the law.
Part III.A describes the law of disparate treatment in the housing context and
the law of discrimination by association generally.  Part III.B details the cat-
egories of plaintiffs considered fit to allege discriminatory action “because
of” race, familial status, or marital status under housing discrimination stat-
utes.  It then explicates how interracial couples that are victims of discrimi-
nation in housing because of their status as an interracial couple alone
remain unacknowledged as a family unit (at least in terms of expressive
value), because they do not fit within any of these categories.
A. Pleading Discrimination in Housing
Under Title VIII, only certain classes of citizens are protected from
discrimination in housing.  As enacted, Title VIII provided that “it shall be
unlawful”:
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer,
or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, or national origin. . . .
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or
national origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection,
sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so available. . . .42
41 Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000)); see
infra Part III.A and accompanying footnotes.
42 Civil Rights Act of 1968, tit. 8, Pub. L. No. 90-284 § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000)).  Subsequent amendments have expanded the list of
protected characteristics to include sex, familial status, and handicap, but the statute’s protec-
tion is still limited to the characteristics specifically enumerated in its text.  42 U.S.C. § 3604
(2000).
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Under Title VIII, plaintiffs can prove discrimination with direct evi-
dence,43 or through circumstantial evidence44 by using the burden-shifting
model that the Supreme Court specifically developed for evaluating employ-
ment discrimination in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.45  Applying this
burden-shifting model to housing discrimination cases, courts have held that
a plaintiff has to prove housing discrimination through three different steps.
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
proving the following four factors: (1) that she is a member of a racial mi-
nority; (2) that she applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase certain
property or housing; (3) that she was rejected; and (4) that the housing or
rental property remained available thereafter.46  Once the plaintiff proves
each of these factors, the court draws an inference of discrimination and
moves to the second step, where the owner or landlord must articulate a
legitimate explanation for rejecting the plaintiff’s application.47  If the defen-
dant satisfies this burden, then, in the third step, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.48 The plaintiff
can show pretext by demonstrating that the proffered reason had no basis in
fact, did not actually motivate the challenged conduct, or was insufficient to
warrant the challenged conduct.49  However, even upon proof of pretext, a
jury may still rule in favor of the defendant if it believes that a non-discrimi-
43 Direct evidence “‘is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that un-
lawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.’” Amini v.
Oberlin Coll., 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2005)). But see Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate
Treatment, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 651 (2008) (arguing that there is currently “a four-way
circuit split” over the definition of “direct evidence”).
44 Circumstantial evidence is, by definition, not direct evidence.  It is evidence that re-
quires an inference to be drawn to reach a certain conclusion.  Minhgnoc P. Tran v. The Boeing
Co., 190 F. App’x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2006).  As with employment discrimination cases, direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is difficult to come by in housing discrimination cases, and
plaintiffs in housing discrimination lawsuits generally try to prove their claims through cir-
cumstantial evidence. See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 109, 182 (2007); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other
Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and
Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1285 (asserting that employment discrimination has
generally become more subtle).
45 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
46 Mencer v. Princeton Square Apartments, 228 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2000) (adapting
the McDonnell Douglas employment discrimination framework to the housing context); Lex-
ington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Comm’n v. Metro Mgmt. Inc., No. 2002-CA-
001234-MR, 2003 WL 22271567, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2003) (same).
47 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981) (noting that the defendant’s burden is only one of production, not
persuasion).
48 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
49 See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff
who proves pretext in the third stage does not necessarily win because the factfinder may still
find that there was no discrimination); Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir.
2003) (same).
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natory factor was at play.  The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the
plaintiff at all times.50
Additionally, a person discriminated against because of her association
with an individual in a protected class can use the McDonnell Douglas
framework to prove discrimination against herself.  For example, a white
individual who believes that she was denied a rental because of her black
friends may file a discrimination claim “because of” race under Title VIII.51
The first court to analyze a claim of discrimination based on interracial asso-
ciation did so through an employment discrimination case and rejected the
lawsuit based on lack of standing.52  However, the vast majority of courts to
address this issue since then have rejected such a restrictive reading of anti-
discrimination statutes.  Recent court decisions have interpreted “because of
race” broadly, reasoning that an exclusion of discrimination by association
lawsuits would run contrary to the purposes of general discrimination law.53
According to these courts, plaintiffs in discrimination by association cases
suffer discrimination because of their own race or protected class, not just
because of their relationship to someone of another race or protected class.54
50 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
51 See, e.g., W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n v. Wilson Estates, Inc., 503 S.E.2d 6, 8-13 (W.
Va. Ct. App. 1998) (relying on a state statute identical to the federal Fair Housing Act in all
relevant aspects to recognize a housing discrimination claim brought by a white woman who
alleged discrimination based on her association with black friends).
52 See Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (N.D. Ala. 1973).  The court
held that the challenged action did not constitute discrimination “because of” the plaintiff’s
own race, but rather involved practices that affected only members of a different race. Id. at
208-09 (“The employment practices which plaintiff attacks in his complaint are practices
which result in disparate treatment of black employees.  Plaintiff avers that he is a white citi-
zen.  The employment practices, subject to challenge in this action, have no impact upon [the]
plaintiff.”).  Relying on Ripp, another district court provided the following explanation for its
rejection of a similar claim of discrimination: “Neither the language of the statute [Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964] nor its legislative history supports a cause of action for discrimi-
nation against a person because of his relationship to persons of another race.”  Adams v.
Governor’s Comm. on Postsecondary Educ., No. C80-624A, 1981 WL 27101 (N.D. Ga. Sept.
3, 1981).
53 These cases, for the most part, are employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Bryant
v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (“Indeed, if
we were to hold otherwise, then employees subject to such invidious discrimination would
have no recourse under state law and an employer could legally engage in such discrimination.
We do not believe that the Legislature intended such a result.”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World
Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
provides us with a clear mandate from Congress that no longer will the United States tolerate
this form of discrimination. It is, therefore, the duty of the courts to make sure that the Act
works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict construction of
the statute in a battle with semantics.”).
54 See, e.g., Holcomb v.  Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (deciding the ques-
tion for the first time); see also Parr, 791 F.2d at 889-92; Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C.,
946 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 682 (C.D. Cal.
1991); Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984).  These cases
are distinguishable from cases based on a denial of the right of association.  In these cases, the
plaintiffs argue that they have been denied the benefits of associating with those “who would
have been included in the relevant context had they not been excluded because of a racially
discriminatory selection process.”  Palmer v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 356 F.3d 235, 236 (2d
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For example, in Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, P.C., a white attorney at a
law firm filed a lawsuit against his former employer, alleging that he had
been terminated because he was married to a black woman.55  In evaluating
the plaintiff’s claim, the district court noted other decisions that rejected dis-
crimination by association claims for lack of standing, but then refused to
adopt the same position.56  The court explained:  “Plaintiff has alleged dis-
crimination as a result of his marriage to a black woman.  Had he been
black, his marriage would not have been interracial.  Therefore, inherent in
his complaint is the assertion that he has suffered racial discrimination based
on his own race.”57
B. Pleading for Understanding at the Intersection of Race and Family
These statutory tools for filing housing discrimination lawsuits are ar-
guably ineffective for truly combating the type of discrimination that interra-
cial, heterosexual couples may face as a familial unit.  The members of a
monoracial, heterosexual couple who can assert the same factual allegations
of race discrimination in their complaint can thus plead their claims together
as a couple.  However, the members of an interracial, heterosexual couple
who are discriminated against because of their interraciality (i.e., because
they have engaged in race-mixing) have to make their individual races and
family unit exclusive of each other in order to explain the factual basis of
their discrimination claims.  In essence, although housing discrimination law
is designed to recognize citizens’ lives as part of a collective unit, it fails in
these instances to fully encompass the harms done to interracial, heterosex-
ual couples.
Indeed, we encountered this very problem with housing discrimination
law when we filed a joint housing discrimination claim.  While our lawsuit
Cir. 2004); see also Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing, for
the first time, the viability of a claim for denial of interracial association).
55 946 F. Supp. at 299.
56 Id. at 299-300 (holding that the plaintiff had standing because the weight of cases that
acknowledged discrimination by association claims “is persuasive and their logic is
convincing”).
57 Id. at 300; see also Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists,
401 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“Manifestly, if Whitney was discharged because,
as alleged, the defendant disapproved of a social relationship between a white woman and a
black man, the plaintiff’s race was as much a factor in the decision to fire her as that of her
friend.  Specifying as she does that she was discharged because she, a white woman, associ-
ated with a black [person], her complaint falls within the statutory language that she was
‘discharge[d] . . . because of [her] race.’”).  The Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion by
highlighting that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not require that allegations
address discrimination based “directly” on an individual’s race.  It reasoned, “Title VII as
actually worded simply prohibits discrimination ‘because of such individual’s race.’  There is
no mention of the words ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ in the statute.  Under these ambiguous cir-
cumstances, we look to the purpose of the statute for its proper interpretation.”  Tetro v. Elliott
Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir.
1999).  Recently, in a case of first impression, the Second Circuit adopted this rationale.
Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2008).
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did not involve a claim of discrimination based on interraciality, we did
confront the question of how interraciality would fit into our factual allega-
tions, ultimately deciding to move forward with a more traditional and “rec-
ognizable” claim based on race.  In this Article, we use a hypothetical in
order to highlight the question of discrimination and interraciality and em-
phasize the difficulties that interracial, heterosexual couples can face in hav-
ing their claims fully embraced and acknowledged by the law.
Hypothetical
Consider, for example, the hypothetical case of a married couple—An-
drew Williams, a black man, and Jackie Owens, a white woman.58  Andrew
and Jackie live in a large city on the East Coast, where Andrew works as a
doctor at a prominent hospital and Jackie works as a high school teacher.
Two years earlier, they had relocated from a large Midwestern city, where
they lived in a suburban house they owned jointly.  Upon moving, they sold
their house and rented an apartment in the bustling city-center, close to An-
drew’s new hospital.  They enjoyed the experience of living in the city, but
wanted to move to a quieter, more residential area.  Because they planned to
wait a few more years before purchasing their own house, they looked for
another apartment or house to rent in a nearby suburb.
Andrew and Jackie found an advertisement for a two-bedroom apart-
ment on a website with local rental listings.  They called the landlord/owner
to set up an appointment to view the apartment.  Although the landlord could
not meet them personally, he arranged a time for a rental agent to show
Andrew and Jackie the apartment.
When Andrew and Jackie arrived for their appointment, they found the
house attractive and well-maintained, and they appreciated its location on a
quiet tree-lined street.  While Andrew checked out the lawn, Jackie rang the
doorbell and was greeted warmly with a handshake by the rental agent,
Betty, who was white.  When Andrew walked up behind Jackie and intro-
duced himself as Jackie’s husband, Betty’s demeanor seemed to change.
Betty greeted Andrew only verbally and quickly turned her back to begin the
tour of the apartment.  Both Andrew and Jackie noted Betty’s odd behavior
but quickly put it out of their minds as they toured the apartment.
As they viewed the apartment, Andrew and Jackie fell in love with it.
Immediately after finishing the tour, Andrew called the landlord from the car
to express their desire to rent the property.  The landlord seemed very happy
that they were interested, and he explained that he already had other applica-
tions for the apartment, but had not yet made a decision.  He instructed them
to leave their application with the rental agent with whom he would be
58 This hypothetical is loosely based on a lawsuit of ours, which was resolved to our
satisfaction.  We are unable, however, to discuss the specifics of that case and have altered the
facts to protect the anonymity of the parties involved.
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speaking later that afternoon.  The owner went on to say that, if they liked
that apartment, he had another apartment just coming available for rent in a
nearby house that they would surely like as well.  The owner gave Andrew
the address of the other house over the phone so that he and Jackie could
drive by it.  He concluded by asking Andrew and Jackie to call him later to
schedule a time to see the other location.  Once Andrew got off the phone,
he and Jackie filled out an application and gave it to the rental agent.  That
evening, Andrew called the landlord to follow up about the apartments.  He
and Jackie were confident that the landlord would select them once he saw
the strength of their application.59  During the phone conversation, the land-
lord told Andrew that he had their application and was speaking to the rental
agent at the very moment, but that he would call Andrew back later.  When
Andrew spoke to the landlord again, the landlord told him that the first
apartment was no longer available.  Then, before Andrew could even ask
about the second apartment, the landlord informed him that the second apart-
ment, which Andrew understood as not even being on the market yet, was
also no longer available.
The next week, Andrew and Jackie began to look on the Internet for
rental listings again.  They noticed that the same landlord had a new listing
for an apartment for rent in that same area.  They wondered if either a third
apartment had become available, if the renting of the second apartment had
fallen through, or if (remembering Betty’s odd behavior) the landlord did not
want to rent to them for impermissible reasons.  Andrew then e-mailed the
landlord, re-introducing himself and inquiring about the apartment listing.
Andrew wrote:
Hello.  I am writing to see if I can reschedule an appointment to
view the apartment that you advertised on the housing.com web-
site.  You and I have actually spoken before on the telephone.  My
wife and I recently viewed the apartment that you had for rent at
34 Carson Road.  I’m Andrew Williams, the person who called to
tell you how much we liked the Carson apartment.  At the time,
you indicated that you had another apartment that we were sure to
like (if we liked the Carson apartment) at 35 Eager Street.  When
we spoke last, you indicated that this apartment was not available.
I was looking through ads on housing.com and saw your ad for
another apartment in the area.  Is this the apartment on Eager or a
different apartment?  Is it available?  Can my wife and I set up an
appointment to view the advertised apartment tonight or any other
time?  Thanks in advance for your quick response.
Andrew Williams
59 The application requested information about jobs and finances, included contact infor-
mation for past landlords (all of whom strongly recommended Andrew and Jackie), and al-
lowed for a credit check.
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In his reply, the owner indicated that the listing was in fact for the
second apartment but asserted that it was still not available.  He wrote:
Dear Dr. Williams,
This apartment, I thought was available, but for now it isn’t.  (We
spoke about its non-availability earlier.  The web ad shows a time-
lag).  Sorry for the confusion.  I wish you good luck in your
search.
Best Wishes.
Two days later, at Jackie’s request, a friend e-mailed the owner to in-
quire about the second apartment, which was still listed on the website.  The
landlord, who was not aware of any connection between the friend and
Jackie, indicated in his response that the house was still available for rent
and, in fact, suggested a meeting time with the friend to view the apartment.
(The friend later cancelled the appointment.)  Thereafter, Andrew contacted
his brother, who is an employment discrimination attorney and is somewhat
familiar with housing discrimination law.  The brother told Andrew and
Jackie that they had reasonable evidence to support a claim of
discrimination.
Andrew and Jackie filed a complaint with the state discrimination com-
mission asserting discrimination because of Andrew’s race.  After all, they
could easily prove the four factors of the prima facie case of discrimination
under this construction:  (1) that Andrew belonged to a minority group; (2)
that Andrew, along with Jackie, had applied for and was qualified to rent or
purchase the property at issue; (3) that Andrew, along with Jackie, was re-
fused the housing despite being qualified; and (4) that the housing remained
open thereafter, and the owner or landlord continued to seek or review appli-
cations from persons of lesser or similar qualifications outside of the pro-
tected (race) class.
During the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the owner pro-
vided his legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not renting the second
apartment to Andrew and Jackie:  that he had to go out of town a couple of
days after speaking to Andrew on the phone, and did not think that he could
rent the apartment before he left.  In fact, the landlord conceded that he did
not enter into an agreement to rent the second apartment until two months
after he first told Andrew and Jackie that it was not available.  He also re-
vealed that he had rented the second apartment to three unrelated women in
their twenties.  These women, apparently friends or roommates, had signifi-
cantly worse credit scores than Andrew and Jackie, and a combined income
that was less than one third of Andrew and Jackie’s.  Finally, the owner pro-
duced evidence that he had rented to white, black, and Asian monoracial
families and couples in the past (though the black couple had begun their
lease after the filing of Andrew and Jackie’s complaint), which would make
it harder, though not impossible, to prove a claim of discrimination based
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solely on Andrew’s race.60  Still, the landlord provided no explanation for
lying to Andrew on two separate occasions by telling him that the apartment
was no longer available when, in fact, it was.  Nor did the landlord explain
why he did not believe that he could rent the apartment before he left when
Andrew and Jackie indicated a desire to rent either the first or second apart-
ment immediately.61
Based on the facts in this hypothetical, although Andrew and Jackie
have persuasive (in fact, almost perfect) evidence of wrongdoing by the
landlord under the McDonnell Douglas framework, they will encounter dif-
ficulty in explaining and detailing discrimination because of the identifica-
tion of their protected class category.  Although Andrew and Jackie arguably
have a strong claim based solely upon discrimination against Andrew, their
strongest claim for discrimination lies at the intersection of race and family,
not just upon race or family alone.  After all, the owner of the apartment in
this hypothetical appears not to be discriminating against either Andrew or
Jackie based upon animus toward their particular racial group, but rather
against them together as an interracial couple.  Yet, the law—here, housing
discrimination law—fails to fully address their experience in the face of
their “complex” familial identity.62  No protected category under the law
60 Cf. Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 842 (7th Cir. 1989) (declaring that “the
replacement of minority employees by individuals of the same race does not preclude a finding
of discriminatory intent”); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1272 (10th Cir. 1988) (hold-
ing that hiring or promoting a member of a protected class in place of a Title VII plaintiff is
insufficient to insulate the employer from liability).
61 Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (“A prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume
these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for re-
jecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is
more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.”).
62 See Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140-50 (coining and explaining the term “intersectionality”); see
also Minna Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 11-36, 41, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1099327) (discussing the empirical difficulties of proving intersectional claims because even
“as multiple claims have proliferated, few courts engage in any systematic or rigorous analysis
of the possibility of complex discrimination”). But see Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass.
Comm’n Against Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989) (“The use of the plural [in
the term “persons”] signifies a legislative determination that two persons cannot be denied
housing accommodations or benefits solely because the owner or administering authority pre-
fers not to deal with certain kinds of people based on, inter alia, their race, sex, age, or marital
status. The statute thus reaches, and prevents, discrimination in housing against, among others,
unmarried couples, interracial couples, younger couples, older couples, and couples who hold
different religious beliefs.”).  Of course, the owner’s evidence regarding rentals to monoracial
couples is not inconsistent with Andrew and Jackie’s traditional race discrimination claim be-
cause the lease of the monoracial, black couple began only after Andrew and Jackie filed their
complaint.
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appears to include Andrew and Jackie’s family as one interracial unit, a fact
that not only complicates Andrew and Jackie’s claim but also redoubles their
injury—at least with respect to dignity—by implicitly erasing the existence
of their family.
Under current housing discrimination statutes, Andrew and Jackie can-
not pursue an interraciality discrimination claim based upon their “familial
status” because housing discrimination statutes define “familial status” in
relation to one’s dependents.  For example, Title VIII defines “familial sta-
tus” to mean:
One or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18
years) being domiciled with—
(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such indi-
vidual or individuals; or
(2) the designee of such parent or other person having custody,
with the written permission of such parent or person.63
Because the discrimination experienced by Andrew and Jackie did not result
from having children in the family, they do not fit within the category of
persons or families included in the term “familial status.”
Additionally, assuming that Andrew and Jackie are in a state that pro-
vides protection for discrimination based upon “marital status,”64 Andrew
and Jackie also cannot prove their claim based on “marital status” because
that term generally refers only to individuals’ status as either married or sin-
gle.65  For example, in County of Dane v. Norman, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court made clear that, under Wisconsin’s housing discrimination statute,
“marital status” was defined as “being married, divorced, widowed, sepa-
rated, single or a cohabitant.”66
Most of all, as we noted above, Andrew and Jackie will encounter diffi-
culty in factually asserting a joint claim of discrimination “because of” their
interraciality as a family.  Had the owner’s actions against them simply been
targeted at Andrew alone, Andrew and Jackie could just seek to plead and
63 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k) (2000).
64 Although Title VIII does not include protections against discrimination due to “marital
status,” many state housing discrimination statutes do. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 12955
(West 2008) (containing a fair housing provision that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, marital status, race, sex, ancestry, source of income, disability and other
factors).
65 See Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Mich. 1984) (reasoning that
“[b]y including marital status as a protected class, the Legislature manifested its intent to
prohibit discrimination based on whether a person is married” under the anti-discrimination
statute in Michigan); see also Hadfield’s Seafood v. Rouser, No. CIV.A.00A-07-008-JRJ, 2001
WL 1456795, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 2001) (noting that “marital status,” as defined in
the anti-discrimination statute in Delaware, was “solely concerned with whether one is mar-
ried or single and whether the complainant was discriminated against based on that single
fact”).
66 497 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Wis. 1993); see also N.D. Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. Petersen,
625 N.W.2d 551, 560 (N.D. 2001) (asserting “status with respect to marriage” means
“whether a person is divorced, widowed or separated”).
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prove disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework by pleading racial animus against Andrew individually (as they
did in this hypothetical).  Because, however, the facts suggest that the land-
lord may have discriminated against Andrew and Jackie because of their
interraciality as a couple, and not just because of animus towards Andrew’s
racial group, the couple will have to engage in wordplay to explain and
prove the factual basis for their claim of discrimination against them as an
interracial couple. Specifically, Andrew and Jackie will each have to assert
discrimination based on the law of discrimination by association, claiming
separately and individually that, but for the race of their spouse, they each
individually would have been treated differently.  In so doing, they will have
to divide their family unit.
IV. CREATING A SPACE OF THEIR OWN:  CLASS PROTECTION
BASED ON INTERRACIAL STATUS
Although courts arguably can find (and certainly would find) discrimi-
nation “because of race” for couples like Andrew and Jackie under the anal-
ysis used in interracial association cases,67 this method does not fully address
the problem of housing discrimination against interracial couples based on
their race-mixing as such.  Rather, it perversely maintains and reinforces dis-
crimination.  Specifically, while the interracial association analysis can tech-
nically offer such interracial, heterosexual couples redress through damages
and other forms of relief under Title VIII, it fails to address the “expressive
harms” or lack of dignity in the continued assumption of monoraciality
among families in housing discrimination statutes.
Unlike in the employment context, where the law of discrimination by
association has been applied to individuals, housing discrimination law is
intended to recognize the family unit, as demonstrated by its protection of
people based on familial status and marital status.  Housing discrimination
law is intended to protect the principle that not all couples or families are the
same.  Yet, in this particular context, the law implicitly presents all families
and couples as monolithic—specifically, as monoracial (and heterosexual).
It mandates that claimants in an interracial family split their individual races
and family unit in order to factually assert a claim.  In other words, it re-
quires that the family unit be broken up, at least legally, in order to receive
protection, and, in so doing, fails to fully recognize the unit’s very
existence.68
67 The court may also recognize the claim without any analysis at all, as the Kentucky
Court of Appeals once did. See Lexington-Fayette Urban County Human Rights Comm’n v.
Metro Mgmt., Inc., No. 2002-CA001234-MR, 2003 WL 22271567, at *5 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 3,
2003) (“As an interracial couple, the Wilkersons are clearly members of a protected class.”).
68 Cf. Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist Paradigm in Sexual Orientation An-
tidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1271, 1292 (2006) (“Exclusion [of same-sex couples in
public accommodations] suggests that the business refuses to recognize the couple’s legiti-
\\server05\productn\H\HLC\44-1\HLC108.txt unknown Seq: 22 29-JAN-09 8:05
252 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 44
Importantly, the analysis in interracial association cases fails to ac-
knowledge the true nature of discrimination against the mixed-race, hetero-
sexual couple due to their interracial status.  Such discrimination concerns
more than pure race discrimination as it is based on the collective, not the
individual.  Specifically, it is based on interraciality and the particular ste-
reotypes targeted at people who together intimately cross racial boundaries.
As the hypothetical in Part III.B demonstrates, it is possible for an alleged
discriminator not to treat individuals differently based on race, but to treat
couples differently based upon racial mixing.  In other words, a landlord can
choose to treat individuals and even monoracial families equally across
many races, but may, if she finds interracial couples and multiracial families
repugnant, treat them unequally.  As the Michigan Court of Appeals once
noted:
Discrimination against interracial couples is certainly based on ra-
cial stereotypes and is derived from notions that the blood of the
races should not mix.  We believe that both the broad language of
the civil rights act and the policies behind the act should be read to
provide protection from discrimination for interracial couples.69
The need for changes in statutory housing discrimination law is grow-
ing every year.  As the EEOC recently recognized in its initiative known as
E-RACE, an acronym for Eradicating Racism and Colorism from Employ-
ment, “[n]ew forms of discrimination are emerging.  With a growing num-
ber of interracial marriages and families . . . racial demographics . . . have
changed and the issue of race discrimination in America is multi-dimen-
sional.”70  If multidimensional discrimination against interracial, heterosex-
ual couples is to be fully addressed in the housing context, legislators must
offer the possibility of a more nuanced interpretation of such couples’ exper-
iences by specifically adding “interraciality” as an additional protected cate-
gory in housing discrimination statutes.  Such an addition is the only means
by which the law may address the “expressive harms” or lack of dignity that
can result from the current framing of family in housing discrimination stat-
utes as monoracial.  As Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality highlights,
broad interpretations of the words “because of race” cannot resolve this hole
in anti-discrimination housing law, as such words fail to fully encapsulate
the ways in which interracial, heterosexual couples are uniquely affected by
the multiple intersections of race and family.  As a consequence, broad read-
ings still fail to address the problem of how an assumption of monoraciality
macy, striking a blow at the couple’s collective dignity and self-respect.  Those dignitary harms
burden the couple’s development.”).
69 Bryant v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986).
70 U.S. EEOC, WHY DO WE NEED E-RACE? (2008), http://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/
e-race/why_e-race.html; see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim Crow: The Enduring
Taboo of Black-White Relationships, 84 TEX. L. REV. 739, 739 (2006) (“Interracial relation-
ships have increased dramatically over the last fifty years.”).
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in housing discrimination statutes pits the individual against the collective
for interracial couples.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article analyzed how avenues for factually detailing discrimina-
tion in complaints by interracial, heterosexual couples can be limited within
the housing context.  In so doing, it focused solely on the issue of race and
the privilege of monoraciality among intimate couples.
This Article began to reveal this problem in housing discrimination law
by first providing an understanding of the unearned privileges, both social
and legal, for monoracial, heterosexual couples.  It then used the theory of
intersectionality to explicate how different types of couples may experience
societal benefits and disadvantages differently based upon various intersec-
tions of identity categories.  Thereafter, the Article illustrated how interra-
cial, heterosexual couples can face difficulty in explaining their harms
through discrimination under courts’ current “because of” discrimination
analysis where the defendant landlord has rented or sold housing to
monoracial couples of all races, but has refused to do so for mixed race
couples.  Specifically, it explained how current protected categories under
housing discrimination statutes essentially require individuals in interracial
couples to make their individual races and family unit separable categories
in order to pursue discrimination claims based on interraciality.
Most importantly, this Article exposed how this implicit requirement in
housing discrimination statutes rests on an assumption of the monoracial
family that works to reinforce the normative ideal of family as monoracial.
In so doing, it reminds us of the need for legislators and courts to reframe
rights and protections in a manner that is inclusive rather than exclusive.
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